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DLD-026        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-3307 
___________ 
 
EUGENE DOUGLAS MANNING, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ZACHARY I. MILLS, ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY; 
MATTHEW DREW FOGAL, DISTRICT ATTORNEY; FRANKLIN COUNTY 
PENNSYLVANIA; CITY OF CHAMBERSBURG; COMMONWEALTH OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1:13-cv-01069) 
District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones, III 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
 Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 31, 2013 
Before:  SMITH, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 5, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Eugene Manning appeals from the District Court’s sua sponte 
dismissal of his amended complaint.  There being no substantial question presented, we 
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will grant the Appellees’ motion for summary action and will summarily affirm the 
District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 In April 2013, Manning, then incarcerated at the Franklin County Jail in 
Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging 
that Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) Mills and District Attorney (“DA”) Fogal 
violated his rights in connection with his prosecution on multiple stalking and harassment 
charges.  Manning also named the Borough of Chambersburg, Franklin County, and the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as defendants.  The Magistrate Judge recommended that 
his complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim.  The District Court agreed and sua 
sponte dismissed Manning’s complaint with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).  
This appeal followed.
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 State prosecutors are afforded absolute immunity from civil suit under § 1983 for 
the initiation and pursuit of criminal prosecutions.  Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 
431 (1976).  They also enjoy absolute immunity for actions undertaken in preparation for 
judicial proceedings or for trial, as long as those actions occur in the course of their roles 
as prosecutors.  Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993).  Supervisory 
prosecutors are also absolutely immune both from suits for acts undertaken in relation to 
an individual trial, and from suits charging that they failed to provide adequate training 
                                              
1
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review of the District 
Court’s sua sponte dismissal of Manning’s complaint is plenary.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 
229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  To survive dismissal, a plaintiff’s complaint must 
“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
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and supervision.  Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 346-49 (2009).  Here, 
Manning’s complaint sought monetary relief from ADA Mills and DA Fogal, both of 
whom are absolutely immune from suit under § 1983.  Accordingly, the District Court 
properly dismissed Manning’s complaint as to the two prosecutors. 
 We also agree with the District Court that both the Borough of Chambersburg and 
Franklin County cannot be held liable under § 1983.  Counties and municipalities cannot 
be held constitutionally liable under the theory of respondeat superior.  See City of 
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 
690-91 (1978).  They can be held liable only when the execution of an official policy or 
custom leads to a constitutional transgression.  Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; see also Beck v. 
City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996).  Nowhere in his complaint did 
Manning allege that his claimed injuries were inflicted by such a policy or custom.  
Accordingly, the District Court properly dismissed his complaint as to the Borough of 
Chambersburg and Franklin County. 
 Finally, the District Court properly determined that the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.  The Eleventh Amendment 
protects a state from a § 1983 suit, unless the state has waived its own immunity, see 
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl.-Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 503-04 (3d Cir. 2001), and 
Pennsylvania has expressly withheld its consent to be sued.  See Lavia v. Pa. Dep’t of 
Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000); see also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b). 
 In sum, the District Court properly dismissed Manning’s complaint based on 
prosecutorial immunity, Eleventh Amendment immunity, and Manning’s failure to 
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establish that his alleged injuries were the result of the execution of an official municipal 
or county custom or policy.  Under the circumstances presented, the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in dismissing Manning’s complaint without offering leave to 
amend.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 110-11 (3d Cir. 2002).  For 
the foregoing reasons, we grant the Appellees’ motion for summary action and will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  
Manning’s motion to introduce newly obtained evidence is denied.2 
 
                                              
2
 To the extent that Manning is attempting to challenge his convictions, such challenges 
are only cognizable in a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after exhausting 
state remedies as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) & (c).  See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 475, 500 (1973). 
